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Abstract
Normative causal decision theories argue that people should use their causal knowl-
edge in decision making. Based on these ideas, we argue that causal knowledge and
reasoning may support and thereby potentially improve decision making based on
expected outcomes, narratives, and even cues. We will summarize ﬁndings from
empirical research, which indicate that decision makers use their causal knowledge
and reasoning when making a choice. Focusing on decision making in mental health,
we will also show that at least sometimes the outcomes resulting from a chosen
action can be improved by taking causal knowledge into account. In the second
part of the chapter, we propose a structured process describing when and how
decision makers should use causal knowledge and reasoning in decision making:
the Causal-explanationebased Decision Making framework. Mental health will again
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be our exemplary domain. We will end by arguing that our model may serve as a
blueprint for a rational model for clinical decision making, which may also guide
future research.
1. INTRODUCTION
Causal knowledge and reasoning are assumed to play a central role in
human thought (Gopnik & Schulz, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 2005;
Waldmann, 1996; Waldmann, Cheng, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2008) and
they are assumed to serve several different functions (Danks, 2014). Causal
knowledge allows reasoners to provide an explanation for the occurrence
of an event, e.g., the loss of a loved one may explain why a person
experiences an episode of depression. Causal knowledge and reasoning
also allow reasoners to predict future events and even the consequences
of counterfactuals. For example, it allows a therapist to envision
consequences of confronting a person suffering from posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) with stimuli associated with the trauma.
The second function of causal knowledge and reasoning is also
epistemic. Causal knowledge enables causal learning (Danks, 2014;
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Grifﬁths, & Goodman, 2011). Computational
analyses and simulation studies show that the data usually available to
learners in everyday life would be too few to allow for reliable and valid
inferences if learners had no previous causal knowledge, which constrains
the number of possible hypotheses (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Without
knowledge about the type of stimuli that usually causes panic attacks it
would be impossible for a clinician to determine, by looking at self-
monitoring protocols, which stimuli trigger the attacks of particular
patient.
Causal knowledge and reasoning also serve pragmatic functions.
They allow people to regulate their emotions in a way that enhances their
well-being (cf. Weiner, 1985). For example, by attributing failure to condi-
tions outside the person’s control, the person avoids feeling guilty or
ashamed and can continue to believe in high capability. Causal attribution
also helps to regulate motivation. By attributing success to personal effort,
the motivation to spend a lot of effort is increased.
Maybe the most important function of causal knowledge and reasoning,
though, is to support decision making. When people make decisions, they
usually do so to achieve certain desirable outcomes. Causal knowledge
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and reasoning can help decision makers predict the consequences that might
result from the different courses of actions they could take. Thereby it
supports decision makers in selecting the course of action that is most
effective in generating a desired outcome. This function will be the focus
of this chapter.
We pursue two goals. In the ﬁrst part of the chapter we intend to
show how causal knowledge and reasoning affect decision making based
on expected outcomes, narratives, and even cues. We will outline how
these decision-making strategies may proﬁt from causal knowledge and
inferences derived from this knowledge. In addition, we will present
evidence from the literature on clinical decision making, which indicates
that causal knowledge and reasoning may result in better outcomes for
the patient.
In the second part of the chapter we show how causal knowledge
and reasoning could be integrated into a uniﬁed framework of what we
call Causal-explanationebased decision making (CDM). The framework
describes when and how causal knowledge and reasoning should be used
in a structured process to improve the choices made. We will point out
ﬁndings, which show that decision makers are able to follow these
recommendations.
In the end, we will discuss how this framework might be used as a
blueprint for a rational model of causal reasoning in decision making. We
will show what further steps need to be taken, both in developing the theory
and in providing empirical support for its claims.
Throughout the chapter we will focus on treatment decision making in
mental health. There are two main reasons for doing so. The ﬁrst reason is
that clinicians are supposed to consider causal knowledge when they
decide on a treatment. Proponents of evidence-based practice in medicine
(e.g., Sackett, Rosenberg, Muir Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996) and
psychotherapy (e.g., APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based
Practice, 2006; Dozois et al., 2014) ask clinicians to take knowledge about
the causal effects of different treatments into account when making a
decision for a particular patient. More precisely, clinicians shall use the
current best evidence from empirical research, the speciﬁc characteristic
of their patient, his or her treatment preferences, and their personal
experience as a clinician to make decisions about care. Clinicians shall
consider evidence and experience to select the intervention(s) that maxi-
mizes the chance of beneﬁt and minimize the risk of harm (cf. Dozois
et al., 2014).
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The second reason to look at clinical decision making is that empirical
research has shown that mental health clinicians (including psychologists
and psychiatrists) have causal knowledge that they could use when
deciding on a treatment. For example, Ahn, Proctor, and Flanagan
(2009) investigated clinicians’ assumptions about the causes of the disorders
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM
IV, APA, 2000). They found that clinicians ordered disorders on a single
dimension ranging from disorders caused by biological factors over
disorders caused by both biological and psychosocial factors to disorders
caused only by psychosocial and environmental factors. DeKwaadsteniet
and Hagmayer (2017) showed that clinicians hold rather elaborate causal
theories about how biological, social, and cognitive factors contribute to
the symptoms characterizing developmental disorders. Importantly,
clinicians also had assumptions about how interventions target the factors
and/or symptoms. Finally, Kim and Ahn (2002) found that clinicians
have theories about how symptoms of a disorder are causally connected
to each other.
These two reasons make clinical decision making a domain that is
especially suitable for our endeavor. Clinicians have causal knowledge
relevant to treatment choice, and they are required to use it, because doing
so is expected to yield better outcomes. Therefore we would expect to ﬁnd
that causal knowledge and reasoning (1) affect clinical decision making and
(2) lead to choices that result in better health.
2. CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE AND REASONING IN
DECISION MAKING
Many different strategies for making a decision have been described
in the literature (cf. Koehler & Harvey, 2004). Some of these strategies
are more likely to be affected by causal knowledge and reasoning (e.g.,
decision making based on expected outcomes). Other strategies seem to
be independent of causal considerations (e.g., decision making based on
social norms or current emotions). In this ﬁrst part we will focus on
decision-making strategies that may be affected by causal knowledge:
decision making based on expected outcomes, narratives, and cues. We
will outline how causal knowledge and/or inferences derived from this
knowledge may support decision making and result in a choice that is
more likely to yield a desired outcome.
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2.1 Decision Making Based on Expected Outcomes
Expected Utility Theory (Savage, 1954; Von Neumann &Morgenstern, 1947)
is still considered to be the gold standard of rational decision making. The
theory distinguishes between actions (Ai), outcomes (Oji), utilities of
outcomes (U[Oji]), and the situation (Sj). The theory assumes that a utility
can be assigned to every outcome, which captures how beneﬁcial the
outcome would be. It also assumes that every outcome can be assigned a
probability P(Oji), which represents the uncertainty that the outcome will
happen. Outcomes are usually uncertain even when the situation and action
are known, because causal relations in the world tend to be probabilistic (i.e.,
P(OjijSj, Ai) < 1). According to the theory a rational decision maker has to
calculate the expected utility (EU) of every action Ai by multiplying the
probability of each possible outcome with the utility of the respective
outcome and summing up the products over all outcomes that could result
from this action (i.e., EUðAiÞ ¼
P
ji
PðOji
Sj;AiÞ  PðSjÞ UðOjiÞ). To be
rational, the action with the highest expected utility should be chosen,
that is, the action that maximizes expected utility should be preferred
(principle of maximizing expected utility).
Apart from expected utility theory as a normative theory, many
descriptive theories of decision making have built upon the idea that
decisions are based on the expectance and value of outcomes of available
options (e.g., Vroom, 1964). Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) is probably the most prominent example. Although it assumes that
decision makers transform probabilities of outcomes in a nonlinear way
and estimate the value of an outcome relative to a reference point, it still
assumes that decision makers base their decision on the expectancies and
values of outcomes.
Proponents of causal decision theory point out that decisions based on
expected utility may be suboptimal when the causal relations underlying
the probabilistic relation between action and outcome are not properly
considered in choice (Joyce, 1999; Lewis, 2006; Maher, 1987; Nozick,
1993; Skyrms, 1982). Expected utility theory takes into account the
probabilistic relation between potential actions, possible states of the world,
and outcomes, P(OjijSj, Ai). But it ignores that the same probabilistic
relation between an action and an outcome may result from different causal
structures. An action and an outcome may be positively related (i.e.,
P(Oj1jSj, A1) > P(Oj1jSj,wA1)) because of several causal structures. First,
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the action may generate the outcome. For example, antidepressant
medications probabilistically generate a better mood in patients suffering
from major depression. Second, the action may not itself generate
the outcome but enable another factor to generate the outcome. For
example, many patients who suffer from PTSD also abuse drugs or
other substances. Detoxiﬁcation does not improve the symptoms of
PTSD itself but provides the basis for other effective treatments such as
cognitive behavior therapy. Third, the action may change the situation,
which in turn affects the outcome. Family therapy for eating disorders,
for example, does not address the dysfunctional eating, but it changes
social interactions within the family that maintain the patient’s disorder.
Finally and most importantly, the action and the outcome may just
be spuriously related. This is the case when the action and the outcome
are affected by a common cause, but the action has no impact on the
outcome. For example, debrieﬁng is a popular intervention after
potentially traumatizing events, and it seems to have a positive statistical
relation with the reduction of symptoms of posttraumatic stress. But there
is no evidence that debrieﬁng has a positive inﬂuence on the symptoms
(Wessely, Bisson, & Rose, 2000). A spurious relation may result, if
debrieﬁng is given more often after severe events when the symptom
load is high. Within the ﬁrst 4 weeks after the incidence the symptom
load goes down automatically, which implies a large reduction of
symptoms when the symptom load was high after the event. After more
minor incidences no debrieﬁng is given. As the symptom load is lower
than after major incidences, it goes down less. In consequence, there is a
positive relation between debrieﬁng and the reduction of symptoms,
which is entirely spurious.
To calculate the expected utility of an action only probabilities that reﬂect
causal relations but not spurious relations should be taken into account
(Nozick, 1993), that is, causal expected utilities (CEU) should be
calculated. In the ﬁrst three cases causal expected utility should be
calculated by CEUðAiÞ ¼
P
ji
PðOji
Ai; SjÞ  PðSjÞ UðOjiÞ, because the
action has a direct or indirect causal inﬂuence on the outcome. When
the action and the outcome are spuriously related, though, the
outcome and the action are independent of each other, formally
P(OjijAi, Sj) ¼ P(OjijSj). Therefore causal expected utility has to be calculated
as CEUðAiÞ ¼
P
ji
PðOjijSjÞ  PðSjÞ U

Oji

:
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Sloman and Hagmayer (2006) point out that it is not only important
to consider causal structures in decision making but also to distinguish
between observing an action and actively choosing an action (see also
Fernbach, Sloman, & Hagmayer, 2014; Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009).
When there is a direct or indirect causal relation between an action and
an outcome, then an observed probabilistic relation is indicative of the
underlying causal relation, and the observed probabilities can be used to
estimate the causal expected utility of the respective action. When there
is a spurious relation between an action and an outcome, observing the ac-
tion is predictive of the outcome, but choosing the action does not affect
the likelihood of the outcome. Hence, it would be wrong to use observed
probabilities to estimate causal expected utility. Consider the example of
debrieﬁng again. If you observe someone getting debrieﬁng after a
traumatizing event, the person is likely to experience a large reduction
of symptoms within the next four weeks. If you observe a person not to
get debrieﬁng after an event, the person is less likely to experience a large
reduction in symptoms. Hence P(Oji ¼ large reductionjA ¼ debrieﬁng,
Sj) > P(Oji ¼ large reductionjA ¼ no debrieﬁng, Sj) when the action is
observed. But this relation is not relevant for deciding whether to give
debrieﬁng. For decision making the consequences of actively choosing
an action are relevant. When the relation between an action and an
outcome is spurious, then taking this action will not affect the outcome.
Thus irrespective of whether the action is taken, the probability of the
outcome remains the same. For debrieﬁng that means that the probability
of achieving a large reduction of symptoms will be same regardless of
whether debrieﬁng will be given or not, formally P(Oji ¼ large reduc-
tionjA ¼ debrieﬁng, Sj) ¼ P(Oji ¼ large reductionjA ¼ no debrieﬁng, Sj)
when Ai is actively chosen. This is because by virtue of choosing the action,
the action becomes independent of the common cause. The action now
depends on the decision makers’ choice and not on the common cause.
Based on these theoretical ideas and causal model theories of learning
and reasoning (Waldmann, 1996; Sloman, 2005), Sloman and Hagmayer
(2006) proposed the causal model theory of choice as a descriptive model
of decision making. A causal model is a (mental) representation of a causal
structure in the world. Causal models represent the direction and strength
of causal relations between the considered entities (usually events or states).
They allow a reasoner to predict the consequences of potential actions
(Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2010; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005;
Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). According to the causal model theory
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of choice, decision makers go through three phases. First, the decision
maker represents the decision problem as a causal model. This model
captures the relevant outcome variables, their potential causes, and the
directions and strengths of the causal relations. For example, to decide
on a treatment for depression a causal model of the patient’s problems
will be constructed. Some potential causes may be observed (e.g., loss of
a loved one) others may be inferred from the observed symptoms using
the causal model (e.g., lack of coping skills). In the second phase, the avail-
able actions are added to the model. According to the theory, these actions
are considered interventions on variables within the causal model. Inter-
ventions may target outcomes directly (e.g., mood-enhancing drugs
reducing negative emotions) or causes of outcomes (e.g., training for
coping skills). The model is then used to infer the consequences that would
result from the different actions by running mental simulations. These sim-
ulations take into account uncertainties, including uncertainties about the
causal relations. For example, in the case of depression treatment, the con-
sequences of various treatments and treatment combinations are envisioned
taking into account that a treatment may not work for a particular patient.
In the ﬁnal phase, a decision is made based on the results of the simulations.
If an option has no impact on the desired outcome (i.e., the action and the
outcome are just spuriously related) or its costs outweigh its beneﬁts, it is
discarded straight away. If there is only one option that increases the likeli-
hood of the desired outcome, the option is chosen. If several options make
the desired outcome more likely, the theory assumes that decision makers
adapt their decision-making strategy to the given circumstance. If there is
time pressure, decision makers may prefer to take the ﬁrst option that in-
creases the likelihood of desired consequences to a sufﬁcient degree. If
there is enough time and the consequences of the decision are important,
the decision maker may prefer to search for the option that maximizes
causal expected utility. In the case of depression, one clinician may imme-
diately decide on drug treatment because it directly improves the patient’s
mood, while another clinician may prefer psychotherapy to target deﬁcits
in coping, because good coping skills will improve the patient’s condition
and protect him or her in the future.
Do causal knowledge and reasoning affect decision making based on
expected outcomes? One prediction that can be derived from causal decision
theories is that decision makers will consider the causal consequences that
would result from the different available options for action. Huber et al.
investigated which information people search for before making a choice
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between different options to achieve a given set of goals (Huber, Huber, &
B€ar, 2011; Huber, Wider, & Huber, 1997). They found that decision makers
wanted to know about the causal consequences of the different options, ﬁrst
positive ones and then negative ones. Decision makers were also interested
in exploring additional actions that might counteract possible negative con-
sequences arising from the different options (“risk-diffusing operators,”
Huber et al., 1997).
Other experiments studied whether decision makers analyze the causal
structure that relates actions and outcomes. Hagmayer and Sloman (2009,
Experiment 2) investigated whether decision makers activate knowledge
about the causal relation that underlies a statistical relation between an
action and an outcome when asked to recommend a course of action.
For example, participants were told that people who watch movies in their
original language, speak better English than people who do not. Then
participants were asked whether they would recommend taking the action
to a friend, who desires to achieve the outcome. After participants made
their recommendation, their assumptions about the underlying causal
structure were assessed (a common cause inﬂuencing the action and the
outcome or a direct causal relation). It turned out that participants who
believed in a common cause did not recommend taking the action, while
people who believed in a direct causal relation did. Hagmayer and Meder
(2013) showed that decision makers spontaneously start to learn about the
causal structure connecting actions to outcomes when making the same
choice repeatedly. Participants did learn about causal structure, although
these inferences were not necessary to pick the best course of action.
The acquired assumptions about causal structure strongly affected later
decisions when new options became available. Conﬂicting evidence, how-
ever, comes from studies on the control of dynamic systems, which indicate
that participants only sometimes consider the underlying causal structure
(Hagmayer, Meder, Osman, Mangold, & Lagnado, 2010; Osman, 2010)
or may fail to derive the right predictions from the causal structure when
it contains feedback loops (Sterman, 2000).
There are several studies indicating that people base their decision on CEU
of the available actions (Hagmayer & Meder, 2013; Hagmayer & Sloman,
2009; Robinson, Sloman, Hagmayer, & Hertzog, 2010). In these studies
the probabilistic relations between actions and outcomes were held con-
stant. Nevertheless participants made differential recommendations and
choices, depending on their assumptions about the underlying causal struc-
ture. In consequence, participants preferred the action that maximized
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causal expected utility. Indirect evidence for the hypothesis that people
decide based on CEU comes from studies on clinical decision making.
Flores et al. showed that clinicians prefer interventions that target the ﬁrst
event within a causal chain (Flores, Cobos, Lopez, & Godoy, 2014; Flores,
Cobos, Lopez, Godoy, & Gonzalez-Martín, 2014; see also Yopchick &
Kim, 2009). Additional ﬁndings pointed out that this preference was due
to clinicians’ assumption that by addressing the ﬁrst cause, all variables
within the chain would be changed in desirable way. Given this assump-
tion, an intervention on the ﬁrst cause would result in the highest causal
expected utility. Related ﬁndings were presented by DeKwaadsteniet,
Hagmayer, Krol, and Witteman (2010), who showed that clinicians rate
treatments as more effective if they change many causal factors that
contribute to a client’s problems.
One study investigated whether decision makers are sensitive to the
distinction between observing an action and choosing an action when
inferring the probability of consequences (Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009;
Experiment 3). In this experiment, participants were asked to predict the
probability of an outcome given than an action was chosen, enforced by
another person or machine, or observed. In all conditions participants
were presented with the same probabilistic relation between an action
and an outcome. The relation was either explained as being due to a direct
causal relation or as being due to a common cause. It turned out that
participants made the same predictions for deliberate choices and externally
enforced actions. In these conditions participants expected to get the
outcome if they assumed a direct causal relation, but not when they
assumed a common cause. By contrast, when the action was observed,
participants expected the outcome regardless of causal structure. In the
common cause condition, this ﬁnding indicates that participants expected
the common cause to be present when the action was observed. Therefore
they expected the outcome.
Several studies on causal reasoning and learning investigated whether
people are able to derive predictions about the consequences of interven-
tions from observations and knowledge about the underlying causal struc-
ture (Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008, 2009; Sloman & Lagnado,
2005; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). Participants in these studies were
asked to infer the likelihood of consequences of interventions they had
never taken or observed before. The ﬁndings showed that participants
could make these inferences. This result strengthens the hypothesis that
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decision makers can decide based on CEU if they have the required causal
knowledge.
However, some studies indicate that people may sometimes prefer
actions that reduce CEU. Studies on self-deception and self-handicapping
show that ordinary people may sometimes hurt themselves although no pos-
itive consequences will result from the self-inﬂicted harm (Bodner & Prelec,
2003; Fernbach, Sloman, & Hagmayer, 2014; Mijovic-Prelec & Prelec,
2010; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984; Sloman, Fernbach, & Hagmayer,
2010). For example, participants in Quattrone and Tversky’s (1984) study
endured the pain of cold water longer, if they believed that it indicated a
good type of heart than when they believed it indicated a weak heart.
They did so although the endured pain had no causal impact on the type
of heart they had. Thus, they violated the principle of maximizing causal ex-
pected utility.
In sum, the empirical ﬁndings show that causal knowledge and
inferences based on this knowledge affect decision making. Moreover,
they support many predictions that can be derived from causal decision
theories: decision makers analyze the causal structure underlying relations
among actions and outcomes, they infer the likelihood of outcomes that
would result from actively choosing an action, and they often prefer actions
that maximize causal expected outcomes.
2.2 Decision Making Based on Narratives
The primary function of a narrative is to make sense of an observed sequence
of events and to explain how a certain situation came about (Pennington &
Hastie, 1992). A narrative represents the sequence of events as it probably
happened. Although their primary function is not decision making,
narratives can provide a basis for decision making. They can do so it two
ways. First, a narrative identiﬁes the factors that causally contributed to a
certain event (e.g., the onset of a dissociative disorder) or situation (e.g.,
an episode of major depression). Therefore a narrative allows the decision
maker to target the causes of a current situation with their actions. For
example, if the narrative indicates that a patient’s depressive symptoms
are caused by a lack of activities leading to positive reinforcement, the treat-
ment may focus on identifying and practicing such activities.
Second, a certain type of narrative may be linked with a certain type of
decision, as is illustrated in medical decision making. Diseases very often
follow a certain course, that is, symptoms occur in a speciﬁc order and
with speciﬁc delays in between. Hence, the development of symptoms
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over time indicates a particular disease. In mental health, there are no unique
courses for each disorder, but there are typical patterns. For example,
patients with agoraphobia often start to anticipate being anxious in public
places and then begin to avoid going there, which results in a negative
reinforcement of avoidance (vicious cycle of anxiety, Barlow, 2002). There
is some indication that clinicians represent the typical causal sequences
of events as illness scripts (Charlin, Boshuizen, Custers, & Feltovich, 2007;
Feltovich & Barrows, 1984), which represent not only how symptoms
change over time, but also the underlying causal mechanisms. In addition,
illness scripts include typical treatments and their expected consequences.
When a new patient presents with her or his problems, the information
on the development of the problems over time allows the clinician to
construct a narrative. This narrative can then be matched to illness scripts,
which imply certain diagnoses and treatments.
The most prominent descriptive model of narrative-based decision
making is the story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992), which has been
developed to account for juror decision making in legal cases. It can also
be used to model decision making in other areas. The theory assumes that
decision makers spontaneously start to construct a narrative when presented
with information on a case (see Pennington & Hastie, 1986). The decision
maker tries to reconstruct the actual temporal and causal order of events.
Events include actions, physical events, and mental states, which are con-
nected through physical and/or mental causation. The resulting narrative
is a complex causal chain with many side arms contributing to the main
causal sequence of events. It explains what happened and why it happened.
Whether a narrative is accepted is assumed to depend on how well it ac-
counts for all case-speciﬁc evidence, referred to as “coverage,” the absence
of alternative narratives, referred to as “uniqueness,” and its “coherence” or
logical consistency, completeness, and plausibility. If there is only one narra-
tive with a high coverage and coherence, the decision maker should accept
the narrative and be highly conﬁdent that the narrative represents what actu-
ally happened.
According to the story model, decision makers have to know how to
classify narratives and to know how different types of narratives relate
to actions. In the legal domain this knowledge is provided by the judge.
To make a decision, a person has to construct a narrative and to classify
the narrative as being of a particular type. The type of narrative, in turn,
suggests the action to be taken. Depending on how well the constructed
narrative matches the different types of narratives, decisions become
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more or less difﬁcult. If a constructed narrative does not match any type or
matches several types equally well, the narrative does not allow for a
decision. Examples for this decision-making process can be found in the
clinical domain. Illness narratives can be matched to illness scripts as
outlined earlier or to descriptions in clinical guidelines that provide
recommendations for treatment. For example, the NICE guideline on
the treatment of depression in adults (CG90, NICE, 2009) explicitly states
that “the choice of intervention should be inﬂuenced by [.] the trajectory
of symptoms, previous course of depression and response to
treatment.” Depending on the type of development, different treatments
are recommended. For example, antidepressant medication or high-
intensity psychological interventions (CBT or IPT) are recommended
for people with mild to moderate depression who have not beneﬁted
from a low-intensity psychosocial intervention before.
Do causal knowledge and reasoning affect decision making based on nar-
ratives? The answer to this question seems trivial at ﬁrst sight. Theories of
narrative-based decision making, especially the story model (Pennington
& Hastie, 1992) consider causal knowledge to be a prerequisite for
constructing a narrative. Domain-speciﬁc and generic causal knowledge
about how the world works are assumed to be involved in constructing a
narrative. However, a narrative may just capture the temporal, but not
the causal sequence of events. Such a narrative may entirely depend on
temporal knowledge, that is, knowledge about how things normally
develop over time. For example, some illness scripts may only represent
the typical course of a disease over time without any underlying causal
mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical research
that directly investigated how causal and/or temporal knowledge affect
the construction of narratives. There is some indirect evidence, however,
from intercultural research on the explanation of illnesses (Furnham,
1988; Murdock, 1980). This research shows that generic assumptions
about the factors that cause negative events affect how people explain the
occurrence of an illness or accident. For example, the Azande believe
that witchcraft is generally involved when negative events happen. In
turn, their narratives explaining a person’s illness involve witchcraft
(Evans-Pritchard, 1976; see also Patel, 1995). Indirect evidence also comes
from studies in the medical domain, which investigated how medical
novices and experts represent diseases (cf. Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). They
indicate that illness scripts are used, which include knowledge about
biomedical pathological mechanisms.
Causal Knowledge and Reasoning in Decision Making 107
By contrast, there is a lot of research that investigated how narratives
affect decisions. The story model implies that decisions will be based on
the narrative and not on the given information per se. Hence, different
narratives provided for the same observations may result in different
decisions. Evidence for this prediction comes from studies on legal
decision making, which show that participants who generate different
narratives to account for the same information, reach different verdicts
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993). The story model also
predicts that a person’s decision and conﬁdence in the decision depend on
coverage, coherence, and uniqueness of the constructed narrative. Several
experiments by Pennington and Hastie (1992) showed that the coherence
of the given information predicts decisions. The researchers also showed
that information about causal relations affect decision makers’ verdicts.
Participants favored the verdict associated with the narrative for which
information about causal links was explicitly provided. The inﬂuence of
uniqueness upon jurors’ decisions was investigated by Tenney, Cleary,
and Spellman (2009). Participants in their study were highly sensitive to
whether an alternative causal narrative could be constructed for the same
evidence. When alternative narratives involving other suspects were pointed
out, guilty verdicts dropped substantially.
The inﬂuence of narratives on decisions has also been investigated in the
medical domain. These studies focused on patient decision making and
explored whether providing people with a narrative would affect their
choices. Winterbottom and colleagues conclude in a systematic review
that narratives inﬂuence decisions more than statistical or general medical
information (Winterbottom, Bekker, Conner, & Montgomery, 2008).
Decision maker’s actions tended to mirror the actions of the person
described in the narrative. However, an inﬂuence of narratives was found
only in about a third of the studies.
In sum, there is good evidence that narratives inﬂuence decisions. They
seem to be constructed spontaneously to organize given information into
coherent causal chains, which explain how the current situation came about.
These narratives are then used for decision making by identifying causes to
target through interventions or by matching the narrative of a new case
to remembered types of narratives that are related to speciﬁc actions.
2.3 Decision Making Based on Cues
Many decision-making strategies described in the literature rely on cues. It is
beyond the aim of this chapter to provide a comprehensive review (see
108 York Hagmayer and Cilia Witteman
Koehler & Harvey, 2004). We will focus on three exemplary strategies here,
which have been described as relevant for clinical decision making (Groop-
man, 2007; Wegwarth, Gaissmeier, & Gigerenzer, 2009). The ﬁrst are fast
and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC group, 1999). These
heuristics assume that decision makers sequentially consider individual cues
to make a choice among options (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) or predict
a criterion (Garcia-Retamero, Wallin, & Dieckmann, 2007). When a cue fa-
vors a particular option over all other options, a decision in favor of that op-
tion is made, ignoring all further cues, which may have implicated other
options. Cues are supposed to be considered according to their cue validity,
that is, their relation to the criterion to be predicted (e.g., the severity of a dis-
ease, Garcia-Retamero et al., 2007). Although this strategy has not been
described as a strategy to choose between actions that are supposed to lead
to desired outcomes, it may be extended to cover these decisions as well.
Depending on the present cues, different actions may have a different prob-
ability to result in the desired outcome. If this is the case, the observed cues
will be predictive of the action to take. For example, to decide whether to
give an antibiotic to a patient, a physician may check for fatigue, body-
and headaches, and the course of the symptoms, because these cues differen-
tiate between viral and bacterial infections (National Institute of Health,
2015). Cues indicating a bacterial infection also indicate giving an antibiotic.
A second decision-making strategy based on cues is the usage of
conditional rules, which specify the action to take if certain cues are present.
Respective rules can be derived from observational and interventional
learning (e.g., Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Enkvist, Newell, Juslin, & Olsson,
2006; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003). In mental health, rules are usually not
learned from feedback. Clinical guidelines provide the rules to practitioners.
For example, the NICE guideline on PTSD describes the following rule to
decide on an extended psychotherapeutic treatment (NICE, 2005). If
symptoms of posttraumatic stress are present for more than 3 months and
there are (1) multiple traumatic events, or (2) signiﬁcant comorbid disorders,
or (3) signiﬁcant social problems, or (4) chronic disability resulting from the
trauma, then extended trauma-focused psychotherapy (CBT or EMDR)
should be considered.
The third decision-making strategy, which is also based on cues and
relevant for decision making in the clinical domain, is decision making based
on exemplars. One prominent theoretical model is recognition primed
decision making (Klein, 1998), which assumes that cues observed in a
speciﬁc case activate memories of similar previous cases stored in long
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term memory. Based on the similarity of the current and previous cases the
action that led to the best outcome in similar cases in the past is chosen.
Do causal knowledge and reasoning affect decision making based on
cues? A number of studies investigated how causal knowledge affects the
search for cues and the weighting of cues in judgment and decision-making
tasks (Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 2006; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2007;
Mueller, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, 2011; Mueller,
Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Maldonado, 2013). The ﬁndings show that
participants prefer to search for cues indicating causal factors ﬁrst. People
also tend to weigh these cues more than other, equally valid cues that are
not causes of the criterion to be predicted (Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage,
2006; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2007). Mueller et al. (2011, 2013) asked
participants to decide which of two people was more likely to have a certain
disease based on a set of cues representing risk factors for the disease. Cues
also differed in their validity (i.e., how well they predicted the disease). In
a series of experiments it turned out that participants’ decisions were strongly
affected by causal beliefs and less by the validity of the cue.
To the best of our knowledge, it has not been investigated whether
and how causal knowledge affects decision making based on exemplars.
Klein (1998) describes causal reasoning as an alternative to recognition
primed decision making, when exemplars retrieved from memory do not
allow the decision maker to choose an action. His research on naturalistic
decision making indicates that decisions makers activate causal knowledge
and simulate the consequences of potential courses of action when they
cannot rely on similar previous cases (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). These
ﬁndings, however, do not address the question whether causal knowledge
affects the selection of cues to activate similar cases in memory. There is
some indirect evidence that it does. The studied experts focused on cues
that were causally relevant for making a choice (e.g., experienced ﬁre cap-
tains automatically checked for cues that indicate the structural integrity of a
burning building, Klein, 1998).
2.4 Do Causal Knowledge and Reasoning Improve Decision
Making?
The empirical ﬁndings summarized in the previous sections prove that causal
considerations affect decision making. But do they improve decision
making? Do causal knowledge and reasoning lead to decisions that generate
better outcomes? We will start answering this question by providing a
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theoretical analysis exploring why causal knowledge and reasoning should
result in better decisions. We will then discuss pertinent empirical ﬁndings.
There are several ways in which causal knowledge and reasoningmay sup-
port decision making. First, causal knowledge may help to identify the cues
that are relevant to consider when making a choice. To decide on an action,
cues indicating causal factors that inﬂuence the likelihood of achieving the
desired outcome are relevant. These factors include causes that maintain an
undesired current state of affairs (e.g., a disease or disorder). An action will
be effective to change the current state in a desired way if it addresses its
causes. Hence, cues indicating problem-maintaining factors are relevant for
decision making. Other relevant factors are moderators of an action’s effec-
tiveness. If a certain moderator is present an action may be less effective to
generate the desired outcome. In extreme cases, negative instead of positive
consequences may be caused by the same action. Thus, cues indicating mod-
erators should be considered in choice. For example, a diabetic may feel dizzy
because of a low or high blood glucose level. Depending on the cause
different actions are implicated. Choosing the wrong actionmay be extremely
dangerous for the person. Causal knowledge may also help decisions makers
to identify the order in which cues should be considered. Cues strongly
entailing a certain action should be taken into account before cues only
moderately related to certain actions. Hence, cues indicating factors that
strongly inﬂuence the effects and the effectiveness of the available options
should be considered ﬁrst. In the example of the diabetic the blood glucose
level has to be the ﬁrst cue to check for.
Causal knowledge also supports ﬁnding possible actions that lead to
desired outcomes as it points out factors that inﬂuence the outcome and
might be addressed by intervention. In the clinical domain, health
could be the desired outcome, which has been deﬁned as a state of complete
physical, mental, and social well-being (WHO, 1946). In practice, a high
global level of functioning or the absence of a currently present disorder is
often taken as desired outcomes. Causal knowledge about the interventions
and factors that affect a disorder and/or improve the level of functioning
helps a decision maker to identify potential actions to be considered in
decision making.
Causal knowledge may also help to identify the consequences that may
result from an action. In clinical decision making, it is important to take into
account not only desired outcomes of a treatment but also possible negative
side effects. While very little is known about side effects of psychotherapeu-
tic treatments, a lot is known about possible side effects of
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psychopharmacological treatments (e.g., for antidepressant medication see
Brambilla, Cipriani, Hotopf, & Barbui, 2005; Degner et al., 2004). By using
such causal knowledge, a clinician is able to consider positive and negative
outcomes that may result from a treatment.
Importantly, causal knowledge allows a decision maker to distinguish
causal from spurious relations. As outlined earlier, expected utilities should
be calculated based on probabilities that indicate causal, but not spurious
relations. Actions that are only spuriously related to desired outcomes can
be discarded straight away because choosing the action does not increase
the probability of the desired outcome. As every action does involve
some cost (e.g., time or effort) the utility of a spuriously related action would
be lower than doing nothing. In clinical decision making, it is especially
important to differentiate between elements of treatments that are effective
and treatment elements that are not, although they correlate with desired
outcomes, because they are combined with effective elements. For example,
some antidepressant medications may have no positive effect that goes
beyond a mere placebo effect, but have more negative side effects (Kirsch,
Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholls, 2002). Respective causal knowledge would
allow a clinician to avoid these side effects.
Causal knowledge enables a decision maker to infer the probabilities of
outcomes conditional on certain actions. As pointed out earlier, the
probabilities to consider when deciding on an action are the probabilities
of outcomes if the action would be deliberately chosen. These probabilities
can be inferred from observed probabilities and the causal structure
underlying these observations (Pearl, 2000; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005;
Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). In the clinical domain, these probabilities
are determined directly through randomized controlled trials (RCTs).
RCTs are experimentally controlled studies, in which participating patients
are randomly assigned to either a treatment or a control group. In conse-
quence, the observed probabilities are a direct indicator of the probabilities
that would result, if the same treatment would be chosen for the same type
of patient. For example, the probability of a remission for patients suffering
from PTSD is estimated to be between 50% and 90% when they receive a
cognitive and/or behavioral intervention (see Bisson, Roberts, Andrew,
Cooper, & Lewis, 2013; for a review and metaanalysis). When clinicians
want to use their clinical experience to derive such estimates, they would
have to take into account possible confounds and common causes that result
in spurious relations. To do so, they need causal knowledge.
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Causal knowledge in conjunction with observations allow a decision
maker to infer the presence of not directly observable causal factors that
may affect the outcome or that may moderate the effectiveness of an inter-
vention. Causal expected utility theory assumes that the utility of an action
depends on the probability of an outcome, which in turn depends on the
action and the situation, and the probability of the situation (i.e.,
CEUðAiÞ ¼
P
ji
PðOji
Ai; SjÞ  PðSjÞ UðOjiÞ). Hence, for a decision
maker, it would be very helpful to know the situation Sj, that is, the
conditions under which the decision is made. Diagnostic causal reasoning
enables the decision maker to infer unknown aspect of the situation from
observations (cf. Meder, Mayrhofer, & Waldmann, 2014). In the clinical
domain, it is important to know about the disorder(s) of the patient,
because the type and severity of the disorder(s) may have a strong inﬂuence
on the effectiveness of different interventions. For example, cognitive
behavior therapy is known to be an effective treatment for mild to
moderate depression, but a combination of psychotherapeutic and pharma-
cological treatment seems to be more effective for severe cases with
psychotic symptoms (NICE, 2009). Causal knowledge about the
symptoms that indicate these conditions enables the clinician to make
inferences that will result in different estimates for the effectiveness of
different treatments for a particular patient.
Given that causal knowledge and reasoning can support decision making
in many ways, one would expect to ﬁnd empirical evidence that they in fact
lead to better outcomes. This is trivially true for many experimental studies on
causal decision making cited earlier (e.g., Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009). These
experiments were designed in a way that considering causal structure leads to
better choices by deﬁnition. Other studies were designed to show that causal
knowledge may bias the weighting of cues in decision making (e.g., Garcia-
Retamero et al., 2007). None of these studies investigated decisions that peo-
ple take outside the lab and that result in outcomes that matter to them.
Studies on patient decision making in health psychology provide such
evidence. Studies found that the best predictors of patients’ choices were
their assumptions about the factors that control their illness (see Baines &
Wittkowski, 2013; Lobban, Barrowclough, & Jones, 2003; for reviews).
People who believe that professional treatments are able to control their
illness are more likely to seek help and adhere to treatments. People who
believe in personal control engage more in active coping and better health
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behavior (Baines & Wittkowski, 2013; Lobban et al., 2003). Thus, different
causal beliefs led to different actions. More important, causal beliefs also
affected health outcomes. People with strong beliefs in personal and treat-
ment control had a better prognosis than people who believed that their
illness could not be controlled (Baines & Wittkowski, 2013; Lobban
et al., 2003). Thus, patients’ causal assumptions could lead to choices that
yield better outcomes.
To our surprise, there is very little empirical evidence on evidence-based
practice in psychotherapy. Although clinicians are asked to take into account
causal knowledge about the effectiveness of different treatments when
deciding on a treatment plan for a particular patient, it is largely unknown
whether doing so leads to signiﬁcantly better outcomes for patients
(cf. Kazdin, 2008). There is one (older) study, however, which shows that
following an empirically evaluated treatment manual leads to a better
outcome for patients than clinicians picking a treatment plan that they think
is best (Schulte, K€unzel, Pepping, & Schulte-Bahrenberg, 1992).
Whether narratives improve decisions is not known at the moment.
Winterbottom et al. (2008) conclude in their review on the effect of
narratives on lay people’s decisions in the medical domain that it is unclear
whether narratives lead to better or worse choices. There is some indirect
evidence from the medical domain, though. Expert clinicians have more
elaborate illness scripts, which in turn improve diagnostic performance
(Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). A correct diagnosis of a patient’s disease is a
prerequisite for choosing an effective treatment. Hence, it seems likely
that constructing a narrative and matching it to the scripts of different
diseases may improve treatment choices and therefore the outcome for
patients. The research by Pennington and Hastie (1992, 1993), however,
shows that the construction of narratives is affected by many factors,
including such arbitrary factors as the order in which the evidence is pre-
sented. Therefore, the constructed narrative may fail to be a valid
representation of what actually happened when conditions are unfavorable
(e.g., a mismatch between the actual order of events and the order in which
the evidence was presented). It seems doubtful that decisions based on such
invalid narratives lead to good outcomes.
In the clinical domain, a few studies investigated whether providing a
causal explanation for a patient’s condition results in better outcome for
the patients (see Kuyken, Fothergill, Musa, & Chadwick, 2005; Persons &
Hong, 2016; for overviews). These studies directly tested whether providing
causal explanations has a positive utility for decision making. Litt, Kadden,
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and Kabela-Cormier (2009) investigated whether knowing about the
situational factors that generate an urge to drink in people suffering from
alcohol dependence would lead to better treatment outcomes. They found
that knowing about these factors allowed clinicians to focus the treatment on
high risk situations and the skills needed to cope with these situations. This
in turn resulted in better coping and less drinking in comparison to a
standardized treatment, which did not involve a causal analysis. Ghaderi
(2006) also reported a positive utility of a functional causal analysis for clients
suffering from bulimia nervosa. He showed that knowing about the
inﬂuence of stimulus control, consequences, and discriminant stimuli on
the patient’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors allowed clinicians to focus
on effective interventions to address the identiﬁed causes. Other studies
found no evidence that a causal analysis improved decisions in comparison
to decisions based on an analysis of the symptoms to be addressed by treat-
ment (e.g., Johansson et al., 2012).
2.5 Summary
The analysis presented in the previous sections showed that causal knowl-
edge and reasoning have an effect on the decisions people make when
they try to achieve a desired outcome. It also demonstrated that causal
knowledge and reasoning may affect several different decision-making
strategies, including strategies that do not presuppose that outcomes are
considered in decision making. Cue-based decision-making strategies are a
prime example of the latter.
The analysis also indicated that causal knowledge and reasoning may
improve the choices made. More precisely, causal knowledge and reasoning
can make it more likely that people pick the option that raises the probability
of the desired outcome the most. They do, because they allow decision
makers (1) to avoid actions that are only spuriously related to the outcome,
(2) to consider factors that may moderate the effectiveness of an action, and
(3) to target the factors whose changes will have the highest impact on the
desired outcome. But the existing evidence on the utility of causal consider-
ations in clinical decision making is mixed. Causal knowledge and reasoning
sometimes seem to improve decisions and the outcomes that result from
them, but they sometimes seem to make no difference. In principle, they
might even be detrimental, when causal beliefs lead to misjudgments of
efﬁcacy.
Therefore, the question is when and how causal knowledge and
reasoning should be used in decision making to get better outcomes. In
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the second part of this chapter, we will propose an answer and describe a
framework based on the existing evidence and theoretical analyses.
3. INTEGRATING CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE AND
REASONING INTO DECISION MAKINGdTHE CAUSAL-
EXPLANATION-BASED DECISION-MAKING
FRAMEWORK
In line with the theoretical analyses presented earlier, we assume that
causal knowledge and reasoning can anddunder appropriate conditionsd
will improve decisions in a way that leads to better outcomes. We propose
a ﬁve-step process, of which the ﬁrst step is to decide whether to use causal
knowledge or not. Thus, we do not assume that using causal knowledge will
always lead to better decisions. The next steps spell out in more detail how
causal knowledge should be used and which inferences have to be made.
The ﬁnal step describes how observations of outcomes should be used to
keep or revise decisions. Fig. 1 visualizes the ﬁve-step process. We call
our framework the CDM, because it involves a causal explanation of the
current situation that the decision maker intends to change.
Our proposal is inspired by prescriptive models of decision making in the
clinical domain, which recommend a causal analysis of the factors and
processes that led to an individual patient’s problem and maintain it (e.g.,
Eells, 2007; Haynes, Leisen, & Blaine, 1997; Kuyken, 2006; Persons,
2008), and insights from the research on causal reasoning and decision
making (e.g., Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009).
The starting point of the decision-making process is a problem. Usually it
is an event or state that is either undesired (has negative utility) in itself or
has undesired consequences. In principle, it may be any situation, in which
a decision maker is searching for actions to improve a current state of affairs.
In clinical decision making (in mental and physical health) the starting point
is a patient presenting with symptoms and behavioral problems, who is
suffering from her or his condition and desires to reduce the suffering by
reducing the symptom load.
3.1 Step 1: Decide on Causal Analysis
The goal of the ﬁrst step is to check whether a causal explanation of the
problem is likely to improve the decision on the action to take. Thus, it
needs to be determined whether knowing about the causal factors and
mechanism that contributed and still contribute to the problem would result
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in a different choice that is likely to lead to a better outcome. Sometimes
there is only one effective option, which makes further causal analyses
superﬂuous. If there are several courses of action to choose from and there
is time to deliberate, two sets of preconditions for the usefulness of a causal
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Figure 1 Causal-explanationebased decision making framework. See text for a full
description of the ﬁve-step process.
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explanation in decision making should be checked. The ﬁrst set comprises
conditions for being able to provide a causal explanation. The second set
speciﬁes conditions for the utility of a potential explanation in decision
making.
Although there is no universally agreed deﬁnition of what it means to
provide an explanation, there seems to be some consensus (cf. Keil, 2008;
Lombrozo, 2006). To give an explanation involves identifying the
causal factors and mechanisms that were present and actually generated
the problem to be explained and/or the problem’s function (its ﬁnal cause).
To do so, the decision maker needs valid, generic causal knowledge about
the factors generating and maintaining the type of problem at hand
and the mechanisms by which the factors affect the type of problem. In addi-
tion, the decision maker has to know how to assess whether the potentially
relevant factors are present and whether present factors actually affected the
problem. In brief, a decision maker needs the causal knowledge required to
establish actual causation.
In clinical decision making in mental health, this knowledge is provided
by theories of psychopathology, which describe factors and mechanisms that
may lead to speciﬁc problematic behaviors and symptoms (see for example,
Maddux & Winstead, 2016). These theories also describe the function that
the symptoms serve for the affected person. In general, valid and reliable
tools are available to assess causally relevant factors. These tools include
structured diagnostic interviews and psychological tests.
Even when a decision maker has the knowledge required for providing a
causal explanation, it might not make sense to search for the explanation. If
ﬁnding the best option only depends on knowing the problem and its
features, there is no need for a causal explanation. By contrast, searching
for a causal explanation is indicated if the available options are interventions
that target speciﬁc factors (and mechanisms) that cause and maintain the
present type of problem. In this case, it would be useful to know which
causal factors actually contribute to the problem to be able to pick the inter-
vention(s) that address these factors. Therefore, important conditions for the
utility of causal explanation in decision making are that there are interven-
tions addressing the causes of a problem and that the decision maker knows
how the interventions affect these causal factors. Just knowing that the
interventions effectively address the problem is not sufﬁcient for a causal
explanation to be useful to make a choice.
If the decision maker is able to provide a causal explanation and a causal
explanation is likely to have a positive utility to choose an effective
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intervention, then the decision maker should move on to Step 2 of the pro-
cess. If the conditions are not met, the decision maker should choose an
intervention that proved to be effective to resolve the same type of problem
in the past. In the clinical domain, this would mean that the clinician should
choose the most effective, empirically supported treatment for the disor-
der(s) presented by the patient.
3.2 Step 2: Provide a Causal Explanation for the Problem
The goal of the second step is to come up with a causal explanation of the
problem, that is, to identify the causal factors and mechanisms that actually
generated and maintain the particular problem at hand. Only if the causes
actually contributing to the problem are known, interventions can be
chosen that change these factors and mechanisms.
To provide an explanation, ﬁrst the potential causes have to be identiﬁed.
Possible causes of a type of problem can be retrieved from memory or looked
up in knowledge bases (e.g., textbooks). Research on causal attribution has
shown that people automatically start to think about potential causes of events
and states that are negative or unexpected and retrieve relevant knowledge
from memory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Weiner, 1985).
Next, it has to be established whether these causes were or are still
present. Sometimes the factors or mechanisms can be directly observed,
but sometimes their presence has to be inferred from features of the problem
or other observable indicators. Research on diagnostic reasoning has shown
that participants are quite good at inferring the probability of a cause being
present from the presence of its effects (cf. Meder et al., 2014). Interestingly,
inferences tend to take into account uncertainties about the causal relation,
its strength, and at least sometimes the base rate of the cause to be inferred
(Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007). Corroborating evidence comes from
research investigating the questions people ask when they are requested to
provide an explanation. Studies found that people often inquire about
factors that they know to be causally related to the type of event to be
explained (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995).
Finally, it has to be inferred whether the causes that are known to be
present or are inferred to be present, actually affected the problem. Even
when a cause inﬂuences an event in general, it may have had no inﬂuence
in a particular case. How people make inferences about actual causation in
singular instances is a currently much researched topic (cf. Danks, 2016). Find-
ings indicate that people believe in actual causation when a connecting mech-
anism is directly observable, but they seem to rely on counterfactual
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dependence, when there is no perceivable mechanism (Walsh & Sloman,
2011). Omitted actions cannot be related to an outcome through a
mechanism. Nevertheless, an omission is considered to be an actual cause
of an event if the event would not have happened if the action was not
omitted (Lombrozo & Vasilyeva, 2016). For example, not providing an acute
psychiatric intervention to a suicidal patient is judged to be a cause of the
patient’s suicide, because the intervention would have prevented the
suicide if it had been provided. Finally, Stephan and Waldmann (2016)
showed that people take into account the sufﬁciency of a cause for its effect
and the uncertainty about generic causation when judging actual causation.
To put it simply, reasoners consider how often a causal factor leads to an
effect in general and how much evidence there is for this causal mechanism.
Thus, people seem to be able to infer actual causation even in cases in which
there is neither an observable mechanism nor counterfactual dependence.
Providing a causal explanation is part of developing a clinical case
formulation. According to Persons and Hong (2016) a comprehensive
case formulation includes a description of the patient’s problems and
symptoms, the factors and mechanisms that cause and maintain the
problems, and the features of the patient or environment that are likely to
affect the treatment outcome (see also Eells, 2007; Tarrier & Johnson,
2016). Clinicians may explain a patient’s problems in several ways. Some
explain a problem by describing the process through which the problem
developed over time, that is, they construct a narrative. Such a narrative is
usually based on illness scripts and theories of psychopathology as well as
the patient’s history. Others may explain the problems by pointing out fac-
tors and mechanisms that are likely to have causally contributed to the pa-
tient’s problems (e.g., Haynes et al., 1997). Potentially relevant causal
factors and mechanisms are described in etiological theories and summarized
in a biopsychosocial model of a particular disorder. Which of these factors
are present is determined by diagnostic tests and a clinical interview.
Currently there are no clear criteria on how to establish actual causation
in the clinical domain. Some seem to assume that the presence of a causal
factor is sufﬁcient for its actual contribution (e.g., Haynes et al., 1997).
Others take the covariation of a factor with the behavioral problems of
the particular patient as an indicator (e.g., Litt et al. 2009). The mutual
agreement between client and therapist that a factor actually contributes
to the problem may also be used as an indicator (Kuyken, 2006).
There are, however, doubts about the reliability of providing a causal
explanation by a narrative or a summary of present causal factors
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(Garb, 2005; Kuyken et al., 2005). Findings indicate that clinicians only
moderately agree about the causal explanation of a patient’s problems
(DeKwaadsteniet et al., 2010; Witteman & Koele, 1999). The only moderate
agreement may be due to the many different ways in which clinicians may
explain a patient’s problems. Studies focusing on a particular type of causal
explanation of behavioral problems (functional analyses in cognitive behavior
therapy) found a much better reliability across clinicians (Ghaderi, 2007).
Once a causal explanation is provided, the decision maker should move
on to Step 3. But, Step 2 may fail even when the preconditions for providing
a causal explanation are met. It may turn out that none of the known causes
of the problem are present or that there is no evidence indicating that the
present factors are the actual causes. In this case, the decision maker should
choose an intervention that is known to be effective for the type of problem
rather than relying on the causal explanation.
3.3 Step 3: Determine the Utility of Possible Interventions
The goal of the third step is to identify the intervention or set of interven-
tions that will change the factors and mechanisms that actually generated and
maintain the problem and to estimate how effective these interventions are
to address the problem. More technically, the goal of Step 3 is to determine
the causal expected utility of possible interventions and rank them
accordingly.
To do so, ﬁrst potential interventions have to be retrieved from memory
or other knowledge bases. Note that the causal explanation provided in Step 2
constrains the search by identifying the actual causes, which should be
targeted by the intervention. Danks (2016) suggests a heuristic, which ﬁrst
searches for interventions that directly address the undesired aspects of a prob-
lem, then moves on to interventions that address immediate causes of the
problem before searching for interventions that address indirect, distal causes
of the problem. Once an intervention is found that would eliminate the prob-
lem, the search is stopped. Simulation studies showed that this heuristic greatly
simpliﬁes the search for effective interventions (Danks, 2016).
Once potential interventions have been identiﬁed, the consequences of
implementing these interventions have to be inferred. Speaking more
technically, the CEU of the different options have to be estimated. By rep-
resenting the current problem as a causal model and possible interventions as
exogenous factors in these models, decision makers can infer the conse-
quences and their likelihood (Danks, 2016; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006).
As pointed out in the ﬁrst part of this chapter, decision makers are able to
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derive these inferences (Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009; Robinson et al., 2010).
They can identify the most effective and therefore most useful intervention,
at least when the causal structure is rather simple and the problem does not
change dynamically over time (Hagmayer & Meder, 2013; Hagmayer et al.,
2010).
In the clinical domain, practitioners are advised to consider the evidence
regarding the effectiveness of different types of interventions when deciding
on the treatment of an individual patient (APA Presidential Task Force on
Evidence-Based Practice, 2006). Proponents of clinical case formulations,
by contrast, suggest using a client-speciﬁc case formulation to judge the
effectiveness of different interventions (e.g., Haynes et al., 1997; Persons,
2008). There is some empirical evidence that the causal explanation put
forward by a clinician affects how this clinician judges the effectiveness of
available interventions for a particular client. DeKwaadsteniet et al. (2010)
asked clinicians to create a causal model explaining the problems of two
children who showed symptoms of behavioral and/or mood disorders.
Clinicians also had to rate the effectiveness of common treatments for these
two children. In addition, they were asked which factors were targeted by
these treatments. The results showed that clinicians’ individual causal models
predicted their effectiveness ratings quite well.
Once the available interventions are ranked depending on their
effectiveness for achieving the desired outcomes (i.e., their causal expected
utility) the decision maker moves on to Step 4. It may turn out that several
interventions have roughly the same causal expected utility. Especially in
mental health, several types of treatments have been shown to be equally
effective to achieve a remission. For example, there seem to be no signiﬁcant
differences between cognitive behavior therapy, exposure therapy, and
EMDR (eye movement desensitization and reprocessing) when treating
PTSD (Bisson et al., 2013). Step 4 addresses this issue.
3.4 Step 4: Decide on an Intervention
The goal of this step is to choose an intervention to address the given
problem. One obvious possibility is to choose the option that has the
highest causal expected utility (principle of maximizing causal expected
utility, Nozick, 1993). By choosing this option, the decision maker picks
the option that has the highest likelihood of achieving the most
desired outcome. However, a decision maker may prefer not to follow
the principle of maximizing causal expected utility. If the decision
maker’s goal is to minimize the risk of a negative outcome, she should
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maximize the minimal utility (maximin principle, Wald, 1945). A multi-
tude of different choice rules have been described in the literature
(cf. Resnik, 1987). Which choice rule should be used from a normative
point of view depends on the domain. In medicine, for example, the
maximin principle may be preferred for frail patients, because it prevents
harming the patient. A decision based on the maximin principle is in
line with the “ﬁrst, do no harm principle” (primum non nocere), which
is an important principle in medical ethics.
Apart from considerations of causal expected utility, there are norms
(moral, social, and legal) that come into play at this point. These norms should
be taken into account as well. In the clinical domain, decision making is regu-
lated by organizational, professional, and legal norms and guidelines. These
prescriptions may conﬂict with each other. For example, evidence-based
guidelines in the United Kingdom prescribe that a patient suffering from
bulimia nervosa (i.e., an eating disorder characterized by the patient throwing
up frequently) should be treated by means of an evidence-based self-help
manual before transferring the patient into an outpatient treatment program
offering cognitive behavior therapy (NICE, 2004). For a particular patient,
though, a causal analysis may indicate that she should be transferred to an
inpatient facility, because the habitual unhealthy eating patterns cannot be
effectively changed through self-help manuals or outpatient treatment. In
this case, the causal expected utility would be highest for a transferal to inpa-
tient treatment, but the decision maker may decide in favor of outpatient
treatment following the clinical guideline.
In the domain of mental and physical health, there is another challenge,
as the effectiveness of an intervention may depend on how the decision is
made (cf. Simon, Wills, & Harter, 2009). If a patient does not commit to
a treatment, it will be less effective than when she or he does commit to
it. The patient’s commitment in turn may depend on how they are involved
in the decision. Involving the patient into the decision may show that the
patient’s goals and preferences are not compatible with the treatment that
the clinician assumes to have the highest causal expected utility. In this
case, the clinician needs go back to Step 3 and reconsider the assumptions
made about the effectiveness of different treatments taking into account
the patient’s preferences.
Once a decision is made, the chosen intervention should be imple-
mented, and the decision maker should move on to Step 5. If the chosen
option cannot be implemented, Step 4 needs to be reiterated to identify
the next best option.
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3.5 Step 5: Evaluate the Intervention and Causal Explanation
The goal of Step 5 is to ﬁnd out whether the expected consequences result
from the chosen intervention. If the causal explanation of the problem is
correct, then interventions on the causal factors that generated and maintain
the problem should result in positives outcomes.
To evaluate the intervention and the causal explanation, the problem
and its causal factors and mechanisms need to be reassessed on a regular basis.
This will show whether the interventions change the factors and
mechanisms as expected. It will also show whether these changes reduce
and ﬁnally solve the problem. If the interventions turn out to be ineffective
and the problem remains the same, the decision maker should go back to
Step 3 and ﬁnd new interventions that address the actual causes of the
problem. If the interventions prove to be effective in changing the factors
they are supposed to address, but the problem does not change, then the
causal explanation is probably wrong. In this case, the decision maker has
to go back to Step 2 and reconsider the causal explanation. As described
earlier, determining which factors are the actual causes of a present problem
is often the most difﬁcult inference to make. Therefore, assumptions about
the actual contribution of different factors might be wrong.
As far as we know, no experimental research in cognitive psychology has
been conducted investigating if and how people evaluate an intervention
and the causal explanation upon which the decision was based when they
are presented with information on the resulting consequences. There are
quite a number of studies, though, investigating how learners change their
assumptions about causal structure when new evidence arrives (e.g., Fern-
bach & Sloman, 2009; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum,
2003). These studies, however, do not deal with learning about a single
instance. The same is true for research on repeated causal decision making
(Hagmayer & Meder, 2013). Research on the story model of decision mak-
ing (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) shows that people take newly arriving in-
formation into account when providing a causal narrative for a particular
instance. But these studies have not investigated what happens to the causal
explanation when people are informed about the causal consequences of the
decision being made.
In the clinical domain, the evaluation of treatment progress is an impor-
tant issue. Symptoms, suffering, and subjective progress are often evaluated
on a regular basis using standardized assessment tools (cf. Shimokawa,
Lambert, & Smart, 2010). The same seems to be true for at least some causal
124 York Hagmayer and Cilia Witteman
factors and mechanisms. For example, the frequency of avoidant behaviors
and dysfunctional coping in the treatment of phobic disorders can be
checked through self-monitoring. Proponents of the usage of clinical case
formulations advise to make such systematic assessments throughout
treatment to evaluate anddif necessarydto revise the case formulation
(Persons & Hong, 2016). Research showed that collecting information on
treatment progress results in better treatment outcomes (Knaup, Koesters,
Schoefer, Becker, & Puschner, 2009). At present, however, it is unclear
whether this positive effect is due to changing elements of chosen interven-
tions, switching to new interventions targeting the same causes, redirecting
interventions to other causal factors, or coming up with a new causal expla-
nation for a patient’s problem.
3.6 Summary
The ﬁve-step process of CDM describes when and how a decision maker
should use a causal explanation to make a decision. If the two conditions
speciﬁed in Step 1 are met, then a decision based on the causal explanation
is likely to result in a better outcome than a decision that is not based on a
causal explanation. These two conditions check that a causal explanation can
be provided and that the effectiveness of an intervention will depend on the
factors identiﬁed in the explanation. When decision makers follow the
prescribed process they will choose interventions that are likely to target
the actual causes of the problem to be resolved. By targeting the actual
causes, the chosen interventions should be more effective than interventions
that merely address likely causes of the type of problem. In the latter case,
interventions may be implemented that address factors that are not actually
present, do not need to be changed, or make no difference in the particular
case. Thus there is a good rationale to assume that the ﬁve-step process may
result in choices that lead to better outcomes than ways of decision making
that do not consider causal explanations. Whether it actually does, needs to
be shown through empirical research.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Our goals for this chapter were to analyze how causal knowledge and
reasoning affect, support and potentially improve decision making in a way
that leads to better outcomes. A review of the empirical research on the role
of causal knowledge and reasoning showed that they affect decision making.
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They inﬂuence not only decision making based on expected outcomes and
narratives, but also decision making based on cues. A theoretical analysis
showed that there are good reasons to assume that causal knowledge and
reasoning improve decision making. Decisions makers who base their
decisions on causal considerations should be more likely to choose the action
that increases the likelihood of the desired outcome the most and eventually
results in the desired outcome most often. A review of studies that empiri-
cally investigated the inﬂuence of causal considerations on outcomes in the
clinical domain, however, showed that rather little is known at the moment.
Although some studies found a positive inﬂuence, others found no effect.
This is surprising, because clinicians are advised to take causal factors into
account to provide better care. Even evidence-based guidelines recommend
analyzing speciﬁc causal factors and the development of a patient’s problems
over time.
The heterogeneous ﬁndings with respect to outcomes might be due to
the fact that causal considerations lead to better outcomes only under certain
conditions. We pointed out two conditions: (1) decisions makers have to
have relevant knowledge about causes and interventions and (2) the efﬁcacy
of the actions to choose from has to depend on causal factors that can be
considered in decision making. If these conditions are met, causal consider-
ations are likely to improve decisions; if the conditions are not met, no
positive effect has to be expected.
Based on the theoretical analyses in the ﬁrst part of the paper, case
formulation approaches to clinical decision making, and insights from the
research on causal decision making, we proposed the CDM. It describes
when and how causal knowledge and reasoning should be used in
decision making to achieve better outcomes. Its ﬁrst step is to check
whether the two conditions speciﬁed earlier are met. The second step is
to provide a causal explanation for the problem that should be changed
for the better. The third step is to use the causal explanation to ﬁnd and
judge possible interventions for their effectiveness to generate a desired
outcome. Step 4 is to make a choice based on CEU and implement the cho-
sen action. The ﬁnal step is to monitor the consequences resulting from the
choice anddif expected consequences do not resultdrevise the decision
and the causal explanation. There is evidence that decision makers have
the competence to perform every step of the proposed process. We hypoth-
esize that following these steps will allow decision makers to use causal con-
siderations when they improve decisions and maximize the utility of the
chosen actions.
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At present, the CDM framework is a blueprint. It is a blueprint for a
future rational, prescriptive model of decision making, at least in the clinical
domain. A rational model of treatment choice would describe how a rational
decision maker would use clinical causal knowledge to choose a treatment to
improve the outcome of a patient (cf. Anderson, 1990). To turn the CDM
framework into a rational model, several things need to be done. First, a
computational model needs to be developed, which implements the
proposed process. Causal Bayes nets (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, &
Scheines, 2000) are an excellent starting point (see Chater & Oaksford,
2008; Danks, 2016; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Causal Bayes nets allow us
to model causal knowledge, inferences based on causal knowledge, and
decisions based on CEU. It will be a challenge, though, to implement the
complex and extensive knowledge of clinicians (including illness scripts,
knowledge about guidelines, evidence-based treatments, and domain-
speciﬁc choice rules) as a causal Bayes net.
Once the model is implemented, it will be possible to run simulations.
These simulations will show whether the model will lead to better outcomes
and whether the proposed conditions for engaging in causal considerations
are effective to prevent decision makers from using causal knowledge when
it does not lead to better outcomes. It will also be possible to investigate
whether the proposed process is robust, that is, whether it works well under
a multitude of conditions. Knowledge about the causes and mechanisms that
generate and maintain mental disorders is still uncertain, as is the knowledge
about the mechanisms by which interventions work (Carr, 2009; Kazdin,
2008). The CDM model should work well under these conditions. Apart
from simulations, it will be important to show that the ﬁve-step process leads
to better outcomes in clinical practice. This will be the ultimate test to prove
that it is rational to follow its recommendations.
Rational models in the sense of Anderson (1990) are also supposed to be
descriptive of people’s performance, when they are adapted to the task.
Therefore, rational models have often sparked very productive lines of
research. Causal Bayes nets and the research on causal learning and reasoning
in the last 20 years is a good example (see Gopnik & Schulz, 2007;
Waldmann, 2016). The CDM framework could be a rich source of
hypotheses. We want to point out some hypotheses that we think would
be worthwhile to test. Step 1 prescribes that decision makers should only
use causal knowledge and engage in a causal analysis when it is likely that
it allows them to make a better decision. How decision makers proceed,
should therefore depend on their generic causal knowledge about causal
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factors and interventions. Step 2 prescribes that decision makers should come
up with an explanation that focuses on the causal factors that actually make a
difference for the problem to be resolved. This implies that explanations
should differ in a predictable way from generic causal models representing
all the factors that may contribute to the type of problem. Step 3 prescribes
that only interventions directly addressing the problem or its actual causes
should be considered when deciding on action. This entails that different
interventions should be considered depending on the speciﬁc case. Step 3
also prescribes that decision makers should estimate the CEU of the different
options. Step 4 prescribes that CEU should be taken into account when a
choice is made. Hence, decisions should depend on these utilities. Step 5
prescribes that a decision maker should not only assess resulting outcomes,
but also the factors that would be changed if the chosen intervention had
the expected effect. Depending on whether the targeted causal factors
have changed the intervention or the causal explanation should be revised.
Many more interesting hypotheses could be derived from more speciﬁc
assumptions about the causal structures underlying the problem to be
addressed and the knowledge the decision maker has about these structures.
If it turns out that the predictions derived from the CDM framework are
supported by the empirical evidence, we may have found a rational model
for clinical decision making that involves the adaptive usage of causal
knowledge. If hypotheses are not supported, we will at least have gained
many new insights on when and how causal knowledge and reasoning affect
decision making and lead to better outcomes.
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